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African Security and the 
Securitisation of Development 
Africa is a major stakeholder in security and ‘security-development nexus’ debates and practice. Although here is no ‘one size fits all’ meaning of security, there 
is a general consensus that security refers both to the stability 
of the state, and perhaps more importantly, to the physical 
and psychological security of the people (i.e. human security). 
It is also generally accepted that security is vital for sustainable 
development. Across Africa, the fundamental challenge of managing or ending conflict(s) 
remains; and with it comes the challenge of creating or sustaining secure environments and using 
security as an enabler for development. Many of Africa’s traditional security challenges persist, 
but through its  for mal institutions and informal networks, the continent has ‘Africanised’ the 
security-development paradigm in myriad ways. As Africa builds its security and development 
architecture, it is Africans who are now the driving force in the process, in contrast to previous 
decades when Africa was often a recipient and a junior partner in security-development debates.
HIstory
Although terms such as ‘security development nexus’ and the ‘securitisation of development’ 
are new, the practice is not a modern invention; there has been a conjunction between security 
and development throughout the continent’s’ history. Pre-colonial states and communities 
were well aware of the complex, constructive and destructive relationship between security 
and development. Although it is always risky to generalise about Africa, we might perhaps 
say that there have been five ‘ages’ of the security-development framework. Following the 
pre-colonial era mentioned above, the second ‘age’ is the colonial period, when security 
and development referred primarily to the colonial and settler states and to the metropole. 
the third ‘age’ was the post-colonial/independence period, which lasted approximately 
from 1960 until south Africa’s first majority government in 1994, included the processes of 
decolonisation; Africa’s proxy wars and alignments during the Cold War; and the wars of 
liberation in southern Africa. During this period, in which security and development were 
couched in heavily militarised and politicised terms, Africa had limited agency  with regard 
to its own security and development and was locked into external Cold War orthodoxies. 
the fourth ‘age’ is the post-Cold War Age in the 1990s. It is remarkable for the relative 
dislocation and ‘siloing’ of  the development and security discourse, in Africa and globally. 
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this was partly as a reaction to failed humanitarian-peace operations 
in Angola and somalia and to the genocide in rwanda. It was also a 
result of the blandishments of global financial and aid organisations 
such as the IMF and the World Bank, whose economic prescriptions for 
Africa emphasised the pre-eminence of market forces and a minimalist 
state (and its levers) for economic development. thus security and 
development were seen by many to be only loosely connected. 
the fifth age, of African resurgence, spans the period from the 
establishment of the African Union (AU) to the present day. this 
period has witnessed an overall and relatively sustained surge in 
Africa’s economic performance and a widening of Africa’s middle 
class (although poverty and the divide between rich and poor is still a 
major problem). there has also been an overall improvement in African 
security (both in hard security and human security) – there have been 
fewer coups, inter-state conflicts and civil wars. Just as importantly, 
Africa itself has formalised the link between security and development.
BUIlDIng AFrICA’s seCUrIty, governAnCe AnD DeveloPMent 
ArCHIteCtUre
the 2002 transition from the organisation of African Unity 
(oAU) to the African Union has been the catalyst for an 
African road map for Africa’s security Architecture (AsA). the 
AU, and the regional and national organisations to which 
it is linked, have four main premises for Africa’s security.
First, although recognising the importance of partnership and 
assistance from external stakeholders, there is recognition that 
it is Africa which takes primary responsibility for its security.
second, Africa’s security road-map requires a formal framework, 
agreed at continental level and implemented at various levels, if it 
is to have any real-world applicability. this has led to the consensus 
on  an AU led African security Architecture framework. the AsA 
articulated the challenges and opportunities for security in Africa, and 
offers a long-term road map for embedding security in the continent.
third, in terms of its hard security parameters, the AsA recognises 
the need to build capacity for African forces to cope with peace and 
stabilisation efforts. this in turn requires the increased professionalisation 
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of Africa’s militaries and improved coordination of continental, regional 
and sub-regional militaries for alliance operations. the establishment 
of the regional Africa standby Force (AsF) brigades in each of Africa’s 
regions is intended to strengthen the work done by AU peacekeeping 
forces. AU forces have achieved a great deal in peace operations, but 
because they often operate as allied but national forces under an AU 
aegis, there have been long term problems of equipment interoperability, 
logistics (particularly lack of air power), command and control, 
standard operational Procedures (soP) and funding. the establishment 
of the AsF, with its permanent regional depots, is intended to build 
sustainable capacity and capability, as well as to shorten reaction times 
Fourth is the realisation that Africa’s security, governance and 
development are interlinked. In this regard, the AsA should be seen as 
part of what we might call a wider African security, governance and 
Development (AsgD) architecture. there are no rigid barriers between 
security, governance and development, indeed, the conditions under 
which regional and continental forces can intervene include situations 
in which a governance and/or development crisis creates insecurity 
(for instance, military coups or extreme environmental crises). this 
securitisation of development, which recognises that security is a 
prerequisite for sustainable development, is important. Also important 
and often ignored is the ‘developmentalisation’ of security; i.e. the 
recognition that security forces can, and should on occasion, contribute 
directly or indirectly to development. this developmentalisation of 
security is already becoming the ‘new wave’ in the security-development 
nexus. It has been spurred by the global recession, by the growth of 
civil society in Africa, by the increasing professionalisation of Africa’s 
militaries and by questions regarding wealth distribution in Africa. 
It relates to longstanding questions about the nature of the state in 
Africa, about the role of the military, and about whether militaries can 
engage in non-traditional projects such as state-building. this has been 
a major issue for allied forces in Afghanistan and Iraq – it is also a 
question which the AsF and Africa’s militaries will have to engage with. 
this is one of a number of challenges and opportunities for Africa as 
it creates an AsgD. the increasing interaction of Africa’s governance, 
security and development institutions is fundamental for the continent 
as it seeks to widen its footprint in the global system. this entails 
ending, or at least moderating, the traditional compartmentalisation 
and mutual distrust and antipathy which characterised relations 
between the security, justice, political and development sectors. 
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Although there can be few illusions that these tensions will end 
anytime soon, in practice Africa has achieved a great deal of success 
in muzzling the traditional turf wars which have characterised 
similar institutions in organisations such as the european Union.
Although necessity and desire dictate that Africa take primary 
responsibility for its own security and development, there is no doubt 
that much of this will be done through continued partnerships with 
external actors such as the Us, eU, China and other Asian and Middle 
east countries. since pre-colonial times Africa has had a long tradition 
of establishing and adapting utilitarian external alliance systems; 
in some ways, these alliances are a modern continuation of these 
practices. Interestingly, however, over the past decade, the sino-African 
entente, with all its achievements and flaws, has helped to usher a 
profound re-examination of trade and aid, particularly as it relates to 
Africa and predominantly from an African perspective. It is likely that 
there will be a complementary interrogation of the peace and security 
aid ‘industry’ in Africa, principally as it pertains to peace operations, 
and funding for security sector reform (ssr) and disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDr). Indeed this is already 
beginning: the United nations organization Mission in the Democratic 
republic of the Congo (MonUC) and other multinational peace and 
security organisations are coming under increasing scrutiny from their 
host nations, and there are deeper debates about ssr and DDr best 
practice, outcomes and local ownership. none of this suggests that 
the hybrid nature of local-foreign security and development in Africa 
will, or should, end; but it is being reformatted for an African age.
there are a plethora of challenges for  African security and 
development: coups, conflict and criminal networks are just a few 
of the problems faced as the continent attempts to implement what 
is in effect a pragmatic morality and code of conduct for a new 
age. Africa’s police forces, which are the daily interface between 
security, justice, governance and development, will have to be a 
priority for professionalisation and capacity-building. In addition, as 
shown recently in niger and guinea, the AU and regional economic 
Communities (reCs) are taking an activist stance against military 
takeovers and unconstitutional transfers of power, a trend which shifts 
oAU ‘non-interference’ to AU ‘non-indifference’. this is  important, 
but the African community also needs to review authoritarian regimes 
which refuse to hold elections, or rig elections, or refuse to concede 
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power after electoral defeat. It is crucial that Africa does not try to 
pacify security and governance narratives by ignoring political, human 
rights and economic abuses for the sake of consensus-building.
While it is easy to dwell on the problems, it is also useful to pay attention 
to what Africa has gotten right: many of Africa’s military, political and 
financial institutions, although often hampered by lack of resources, 
have world class personnel and are highly proficient. For instance, 
African peacekeepers are highly regarded in global operations. Also, 
claims that the global recession has had a lesser impact on Africa 
because Africa’s economies are smaller and have a much greater 
informal economy, are only partly true; it may well be that many of 
Africa’s financial institutions are in fact better managed than their 
developed world counterparts. Africa’s diverse state systems, which 
are often seen as a liability for continental development, may actually 
be an asset; it gives alternatives in cases where a Westphalian state 
model may be inapplicable. It may also encourage public-private sector 
partnerships and the informal economy to become key components 
of the AsDg architecture. Also worthy of note is increasing African 
ownership of  the ranking systems for Africa’s security-development 
nexus. various organisation do country risk assessments and rankings 
according to complex indices of governance, human rights, security and 
development . these rankings do matter, as they are taken seriously by 
investors and other interested parties. traditionally, it is externally based 
consultancies which have done the rankings; now however, African-
led and African-based groups such as the Mo Ibrahim Foundation 
and Afrobarometer are also issuing rankings which pay particular 
attention to the divergent opinions of citizens of the relevant counties. 
ConClUsIon
there will always be differences of opinion regarding the 
theory and practice of security, governance and development in 
Africa. What matters, however, is that the importance of these 
linkages has been recognised in Africa and that concrete action 
is being taken by the continent to establish a sustainable AsgD 
architecture that is appropriate to local priorities. this retreat from 
outsourcing its agendas is a recognition by Africa and its people 
that it is they in the long run who will make the continent’s future.
